Abstract-We consider keyless authentication for point-topoint communication in the presence of a myopic adversary. In particular, the adversary has access to a non-causal noisy version of the transmission and may use this knowledge to choose a channel state; the receiver is successful if it either decodes to the correct message or correctly detects adversarial interference. We show that, depending on the relationship between the channels to the legitimate receiver and the adversary, the authentication capacity is either zero or bounded above by the no-adversary capacity. To this end we introduce a novel channel property, termed U-overwritability, which allows the adversary to make its false message appear legitimate. We conjecture that if the capacity is nonzero, it is in fact equal to the no-adversary capacity, and show that this is true for a particular binary model.
I. Introduction
Consider the point-to-point setting in which a transmitter wishes to communicate with a receiver in the presence of a malicious adversary. Rather than requiring that the transmitted message be recovered, we allow the receiver to instead declare the transmission has been corrupted by the adversary. This problem, known as authentication, is a relaxation of the more general arbitrarily-varying channel (AVC): in both settings, the channel takes as inputs both the legitimate and an adversarial transmission [1] , and the adversary maliciously chooses a state with the goal of causing a decoding error at the receiver. A plethora of variations on the AVC and authentication appear in the literature, in which the adversary has varying degrees of power and knowledge of the legitimate transmission, and the transmitter and receiver may or may not have access to shared secret information.
In this paper, we focus on the case in which the adversary has some limited knowledge of the transmitted sequence. That is, the adversary chooses a state based on a non-causal noisy version of the legitimate transmission, as well as knowledge of the codebook. Adversaries with some additional knowledge regarding the transmission in the AVC setting are studied in [2] , [3] , and [4] . Myopic adversaries are explicitly introduced in [2] . In particular, the capacity of an AVC with a myopic adversary who does not have knowledge of the codebook realization (i.e., the legitimate users share common randomness) is characterized. In [3] , the authors provide bounds on the capacity of the AVC in the presence of a power-constrained myopic adversary. They show that once the channel to the adversary is poor enough, it cannot act in a more intelligent way than if it were oblivious. The authors of [4] examine the case in which both the transmitter and myopic adversary are quadratically power-constrained in the context of Gaussian channels. For the case of authentication, an inner bound on authentication capacity is proposed in [5] for a model where the adversary is aware of the message being transmitted as well as the code. This can be considered a special case of the more general myopic adversary. In [6] the authors consider authentication in the presence of a myopic adversary, but allow for shared randomness between the transmitter and receiver.
In the following, we consider authentication in the case where the legitimate users do not have a pre-shared key, and the adversary has unlimited power and is aware of the codebook, but has limited information about the actual transmission.
Note that a myopic model bridges the gap between oblivious and omniscient adversaries. In [7] , we present a condition called overwritability and show that it characterizes the authentication capacity in the case of an oblivious adversary. In this work, we present a new analogous condition called U-overwritability that will help us to characterize the authentication capacity in the presence of a myopic adversary; this condition depends not only on the (state-dependent) channel between legitimate users, but also the channel between the transmitter and adversary, given by a distribution U Z|X . We use this to derive outer bounds on authentication capacity, and, for a particular binary case, provide the exact capacity expression. This paper is organized as follows. In Section II we introduce the model and necessary notation. We derive upper bounds on the myopic adversarial channel authentication capacity and conjecture they are tight in Section III. In Section IV, we introduce a specific binary model and state its authentication capacity. Section V concludes the paper.
II. Preliminaries
Throughout the paper, a binary (M, n) code is a code with M codewords and block length n. The notation H(·) will indicate the binary entropy function, · will denote the Hamming weight of a vector, and ⊕ will be used to indicate (coordinatewise) modulo 2 addition. Given a random variable X with alphabet X and distribution P X , where P X (x) is an integer multiple of 1 /n for all x ∈ X, we write τ X to indicate the type class corresponding to P X (i.e. the set of vectors of length n whose empirical distributions match the distribution P X ).
We consider authentication when there is a legitimate transmitter and receiver as well as an active adversary who induces some channel state at each transmission. We assume that the adversary has full knowledge of the codebook of the legitimate parties, though not necessarily of the specific transmission being sent. More formally, let W Y|X,S be a discrete memoryless adversarial channel with the sets X, S, and Y as the input, state, and output alphabets, respectively, such that for lengthn sequences x, s, and y ∈ X n , S n , and Y n ,
With a slight abuse of notation, we write W(y | x, s) when the sequence lengths are understood. Similarly, there is a discrete memoryless channel (DMC) between the legitimate transmitter and the adversary given by U Z|X , where Z is the output alphabet at the adversary, so that the adversary has a noisy version z of any transmitted sequence x with probability U(z | x). See Figure 1 for a depiction of this setup. . The adversary views a noisy version z of this transmission and sends state s to the channel between transmitter and receiver. The receiver then receives y, whose probability is conditioned on both the legitimate transmission and the adversarial state, and decodes to φ(y) ∈ [M] ∪ {0}, where "0" is a declaration of adversarial interference.
A myopic adversary will be formally defined by a distribution J S n |Z n , where the adversary's choice of J may depend on U and on the codebook used by the legitimate users. Notice that the case in which the adversary's choice is deterministic, as in [2] , is included in the above definition.
Let s 0 ∈ S and the corresponding constant state sequence s 0 ∈ S n represent the state in which there is no adversary: i.e. W Y|X,S =s 0 is a non-adversarial channel. An authentication code for W is a (possibly stochastic) encoder and decoder pair:
where an output of "0" indicates a declaration of adversarial interference. The decoder φ is successful if either the output is equal to the input message, or s s 0 and the output is equal to 0. In other words, the decoder either successfully detects adversarial interference, or decodes correctly.
Let φ −1 (A) ⊆ Y n represent the set of channel outputs which decode to some i ∈ A under φ, and let φ −1 (A) c be the complement of this set in Y n . Let x i := f (i) denote the length-n encoding of message i. Given transmitted message i and choice of myopic adversary J, we define the probability of error for the authentication code ( f, φ) as:
If the adversary is absent, then J(s 0 | z) = 1 for all z ∈ Z n . We denote this distribution by J s 0 , and observe that
Similarly, if the adversary decides that J(s | z) = 1 for all z ∈ Z n and some particular s s 0 , denoted J s ,
The above two cases show the reduction to the so-called oblivious case, in which the adversary has no knowledge about the transmission before choosing a state vector s. This means that X and S are independent.
We assume that each message in [M] := {1, 2, . . . , M} is transmitted with equal probability. Then the average probability of error over all possible messages for a given choice of J is given by
J).
A rate R is achievable if there exists a sequence of (2 nR , n) authentication codes such that sup J e(J) → 0 as n → ∞. Notice that sup J e(J) is the highest error probability the adversary can hope for, achieved by designing J optimally. The authentication capacity C auth is the supremum of all achievable rates. Let C denote the capacity in the no-adversary setting (i.e., J = J s 0 ).
In [7] we show that a channel property called overwritability exactly determines when the authentication capacity is nonzero for oblivious adversaries. An adversarial channel W with noadversary state s 0 is overwritable if there exists a distribution
Intuitively, over an overwritable channel, an adversary can seamlessly make their own false message appear legitimate to the receiver without being detected.
Theorem II.1. [7] If a channel with an oblivious adversary is not overwritable, then C auth = C; if it is overwritable, then C auth = 0.
Overwritability should be compared with symmetrizability for the standard AVC problem [8] : W is symmetrizable if there exists P S |X such that s P S |X (s | x )W(y | x, s) = When the adversary is not oblivious, we propose a new modification of overwritability, called U-overwritability, that will help us to characterize capacity in the myopic case.
Definition II.2. We say that an adversarial channel W with no-adversary state s 0 is U-overwritable if there exists a distribution P S |X ,Z such that
Let 1 Z|X be the deterministic identity distribution: that is, 1(z | x) = 1 if z = x, and zero otherwise. This corresponds to the case of a so-called omniscient adversary, and induces a special case of U-overwritability.
Definition II.3. An adversarial channel W with no-adversary state s 0 is I-overwritable if there exists a distribution P S |X ,X such that
Clearly, if the adversary can successfully generate a false message given a noisy version of the transmission, it is also successful in the noiseless case. This is formalized in the following lemma.
Lemma II.4. If a channel W is U-overwritable for some U, then it is also I-overwritable.
Proof. Let P S |X ,Z be the distribution guaranteed by U-overwritability.
and the channel is I-overwritable.
III. Outer Bounds on Authentication Capacity
In this section, we give outer bounds on the myopic authentication capacity, and conjecture that those bounds are tight.
Theorem III.1. If W is U-overwritable, C auth = 0.
Proof. Suppose W is U-overwritable, and let P S |X ,Z be the distribution guaranteed by Definition II.2. Consider a sequence of (2 nR , n) authentication codes with R > 0, and
where (1) follows from U-overwritability, (2) follows because j ∈ {i, 0} c as long as i j, and J s 0 is as defined in Section II. Then sup J e(J) ≥ e(J), and simultaneously, sup J e(J) ≥ e(J s 0 ). We conclude that sup J e(J) ≥ M−1 2M−1 , which approaches 1/2 as n → ∞. Thus, C auth = 0.
Theorem III.2. Suppose that W Y|X,S =s 0 is stochastically degraded with respect to U. Then, if W is I-overwritable, C auth = 0.
Proof. Suppose that W is I-overwritable, and let P S |X ,X be the distribution guaranteed by I-overwritability. Because W Y|X,S =s 0 is stochastically degraded with respect to U, there exists P Y|Z such that z U(z|x)P Y|Z (y|z) = W(y|x, s 0 ). Consider a sequence of (2 nR , n) authentication codes with R > 0, and
, where φ is the decoding rule of the legitimate receiver. Since the code is error-correcting for the no-adversary case, the probability φ(y) = x i given x i was transmitted approaches 1 as n → ∞. We lower bound this probability by λ n . Then,
where (3) follows from Definition II.3. We conclude that sup J e(J) > λ n (M−1) (λ n +1)M−λ n , which approaches 1/2 as n → ∞, and so C auth = 0.
Observe that any authentication code must also be an errorcorrecting code for the underlying non-adversarial channel, and so it is always the case that C auth ≤ C. We conjecture that not only is the non-adversarial capacity an upper bound when the capacity is nonzero, but that in fact C auth = C. Observe that there are some cases not covered in this section; these are a subject of ongoing work.
IV. A Myopic Binary Adversarial Channel
In this section, we examine in detail a binary model that will provide insight into the more general setting. Recall that binary symmetric channel with crossover probability p, denoted BSC p , is a binary-input, binary-output channel such that the probability that the input does not equal the output is equal to p. In this model, the adversary views the transmitted codeword through a BSC q , and decides on a state sequence s, which is added to the transmission x. The sequence x ⊕ s is transmitted across a BSC p . We call this the myopic binary adversarial channel with parameters p and q, and denote it by MBAC p,q .
Theorem IV.1. If 0 ≤ p < q ≤ 1/2, the authentication capacity C auth is equal to 1 − H(p). If 0 ≤ q ≤ p ≤ 1/2, C auth = 0.
Theorem IV.1 converse proof. Since any authentication code must also be an error-correcting code for the underlying nonadversarial channel, we have C auth ≤ 1 − H(p).
It is straightforward to show that if 0 ≤ q ≤ p ≤ 1/2, W Y|X,S =s 0 is stochastically degraded with respect to U and the channel is I-overwritable: choose P S |X ,X to be deterministic such that s = x ⊕ x. Then, by Theorem III.2, C auth = 0.
Per the MBAC p,q model, the adversary can see a noisy version of the transmitted codeword. In our proof of achievability, we will strengthen the adversary in order to simplify some arguments. Proving achievability for a stronger adversary simultaneously proves the result for any weaker adversary. Specifically, we introduce an oracle who will reveal to the adversary the exact distance d of the transmitted codeword, x i , from the received word z. Generally speaking, even given this information, there remain enough potentially transmitted words to make the adversary's task difficult. We will assume in our proof here that the encoding is injective. This assumption is reasonable since the number of messages corresponding to a single codeword is at most polynomial in n with high probability, and so asymptotically we may reduce to this case anyway. In addition, we will allow the adversary to be aware of the exact error pattern of the BSC p between the transmitter and receiver, so that it can design the state knowing exactly what the receiver will see.
Theorem IV.1 achievability proof. If 0 ≤ q < p ≤ 1/2, C auth = 0, and a proof of achievability is not required.
Let 0 ≤ p < q ≤ 1/2. Without loss of generality, let R = 1−H(p)−δ > 1−H(q) for δ > 0 sufficiently small. We construct a (M := 2 nR , n) code family with vanishing probability of error. We first present two lemmas that will allow us to choose a good codebook. The first is a variation of Lemma 3 from [8] .
Lemma IV.2 ([8])
. Let 1 > 0 and let x 1 , . . . , x M be drawn uniformly at random from the type class of type P X , where M = 2 nR . With high probability, this codebook satisfies the following. For any type class τ XX S and any sequence s,
The following is Lemma IV.2 of [3] ; though the overall model of [3] differs from the work here in several respects (see Remark IV.5), the number of codewords that are consistent with what is seen by the adversary is the same in the two models. In [3] , codewords are selected uniformly at random from the type class τ X , where X ∼Bernoulli(1/2).
Lemma IV.3 ([3]
). Let 2 , 3 > 0 be sufficiently small, and let |d − nq| ≤ n 2 . With high probability over the choice of codebook, for every z ∈ {0, 1} n , the number of codewords exactly distance d from z is bounded below by
We now use the above results to design our code. Codebook: By Lemmas IV.2 and IV.3, for n sufficiently large, there exist codewords x 1 , . . . , x M drawn from the type class P X , where X ∼ Bernoulli(1/2), such that: (1) for every z ∈ {0, 1} n , the number of codewords that are distance d from z, where |d − nq| ≤ n 2 , is bounded below by 2 n(H( d /n)−H(p)−δ− 3 ) , and (2) for any type class τ XX S and any sequence s, (4) holds.
Encoding: Given a message i ∈ [M], transmit x i . Decoding: Let > 0 be sufficiently small. Given an output y ∈ {0, 1} n , decode to message i ∈ [M] if i is unique with the property that x i ⊕y < n(p+ ). Otherwise, declare adversarial interference by outputting "0".
Probability of error analysis: Define
z ⊕ x i = d}, and
That is, S (z, d) is the set of messages in [M] whose corresponding codewords are Hamming distance d from z ∈ {0, 1} n , and E(s) is the set of messages i in [M] such that adding s to x i results in the decoder potentially confusing the intended message with a false message j. For ease of notation, let B = {d ∈ Z ≥0 : |d − qn| ≤ n 2 }. Let J S |Z,D be any choice of myopic adversary with knowledge of the distance, given by the random variable D, to the transmitted codeword. For fixed J, e(i, J) is the probability of decoding error given that message i was sent. Then,
Consider the sum
, where s, z, and d are fixed. Since every codeword distance d from z is equiprobable,
) above by 1, and thus bound the second half of (5) by d B P(d), which vanishes in n. Now suppose d ∈ B. Observe that P(error | x i , s, z) = 0 if for every j i, x i ⊕ s ⊕ x j ≥ n(p + ). In other words, P(error | x i , z, s) = 0 if i E(s). Then, the summation reduces to 1
Lemma IV.4. For sufficiently large n, and d such that |d−nq| ≤ 2 n,
Proof of Lemma IV.4. We can upper bound the left-hand side of (7) by splitting into different type classes. Namely,
where the binary random variables X, X , S , Z satisfy
Applying Lemma IV.2 with (S , Z) in place of S , we have
We now want to bound this for random variables satisfying (8) . In particular, consider two cases. First, if R ≤ I(X ; S Z), then we have that R − I(X; X S Z) + |R − I(X ; S Z)| + + is equal to = R − I(X; X S Z)
where (10) follows from the data processing inequality, (11) from the last condition of (8) 
≤ 2R − I(X; Z) − I(X ; X ⊕ S )
where (13) and (14) follow from the chain rule, (15) from the data processing inequality, (16) from the last two conditions of (8) , and (17) holds for sufficiently small. Either way, (9) is upper bounded by 2 n(H( d /n)−H(p)−1.5δ+ 1 ) .
Since there are only a polynomial number of types, for sufficiently large n, we have shown (7).
Combining Lemmas IV.3 and IV.4 allows us to upper bound (6) by α n := 2 n(−0.5δ+2 1 + 3 ) , so e(J) ≤ α n + d B P(d). For any δ > 0 we can make 1 and 3 small enough so that 2 1 + 3 < 0.5δ. Thus, both terms are vanishing in n, and sup J e(J) → 0 as n → ∞, proving achievability.
Remark IV.5. The authors of [3] examine capacity under the following model: the adversary views the transmitted codeword through a BSC q , and decides on a state sequence s such that s ≤ tn for fixed parameter t (to avoid confusion, we use "t" rather than "p" as used in [3] ). This state sequence is added to x and sent noiselessly to the receiver. This differs from our model in two significant ways: (1) the adversary is power constrained and the no-adversary case is noiseless, and (2) error correction rather than authentication is considered.
Consider this model in the authentication setting. Because the channel is not overwritable for any power constraint t, the oblivious case of q = 1/2 yields an authentication capacity of C auth = 1, the non-adversarial capacity, by Theorem II.1. In fact, Theorem IV.1 shows that even if the adversary can flip any number of bits (i.e. t = 1), as long as q > 0, the authentication capacity is equal to 1. Interestingly, the power constraint t, which is instrumental in the general AVC case, is immaterial in the authentication case.
V. Conclusions
We introduced a new channel condition for myopic adversaries, termed U-overwritability, and showed that this condition helps to characterize the authentication capacity C auth . We provided outer bounds on C auth in the presence of a myopic adversary, and conjectured as to the achievability of those bounds. For the case of a BSC q to the adversary and a BSC p to the intended receiver we showed that C auth can be exactly characterized.
